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1. Introduction
The discourse surrounding the internet and new media is rapidly changing. Where there once was a more enthusiastic rhetoric regarding the “promises” of digital 
technology as a harbinger of citizen participation, open and 
accountable governance and democracy globally, the debate has 
now increasingly shifted to its “dark” side: new media as a platform 
for violent online political extremism. Indeed, critical security 
scholars have argued that a new “dispositif” of risk has emerged 
whereby these imagined dangers of digital technologies need 
to now be contained and controlled through the development 
of new political, legal and technological mechanisms, such as 
surveillance and censorship, predictive policing, and cooperation 
with internet intermediaries to monitor and remove extremist 
content (see Amoore and de Goede 2008; Argomaniz 2015; 
Grusin 2010; Nouri and Whiting 2014). 
Given the complex nature regarding the role digital technologies 
play in occurrences of violent extremism, this article argues 
that a different approach is needed. Instead of asking what 
role new media plays in facilitating violent radicalisation, we 
need to examine the context in which it has been imagined as 
something in the first place and with what consequences. To 
this end, the article examines how the relationship between 
digital technology and violent extremism has been articulated 
in the European Union’s (EU) counter­terrorism policy and 
specifically around the creation of the EU Internet Referral 
Unit (IRU). In the first section of this article, we explore the 
debates surrounding digital technology and the recent shift of 
the discourse to its “dark” side. Following this, the analytical 
framework will be outlined, and in the final section we critically 
examine recent EU documents that detail the perceived growing 
threat posed by online violent radicalisation and responses to it.
2. The many “risks” of digital technology 
Assumptions regarding the political significance of new digital 
technologies have historically tended to oscillate between a 
kind of techno­utopianism, in which digital technologies have 
been seen as instrumental in bringing about positive democratic 
change, and a more techno­pessimist approach, which has 
correlated digital technology with increased government 
control over the public sphere. This imposition of political 
value onto a diverse set of different “media­related practices” 
(Hobart 2010, Couldry 2014) is perhaps best exemplified by 
the labelling of the events during the so­called Arab Spring in 
2010­2012 as “Twitter” or “Facebook” revolutions (see Johnson 
et al. 2013; Ghomin 2012; Oh et al. 2015). Christensen (2010) 
writes that this kind of enthusiasm has usually been followed 
by a critical inquiry regarding the extent of what the perceived 
benefits of the technology actually were:
In the first camp, we find those who trumpet the virtues of new 
technologies such as Twitter and YouTube, linking, for example, 
the erosion of oppressive state power with access to and use 
of social media. In the latter camp, the techno­dystopians (or 
debunkers), we find those who consider techno­utopianism as 
nothing more than technological determinism (Christensen 
2010: 155­156). 
The ensuing “Arab Winter” has since provided a bleak reminder 
that these digital revolutions were perhaps not all that they 
seemed. There has been a violent backlash against youthful 
eruptions of democratic fervour at the hands of entrenched 
political elites in Egypt, often using the same digital technologies 
to suppress dissent that were used to inspire it. Moreover, a 
bloody civil war in Syria has had profound ramifications on 
the rest of the world, and perhaps most notably facilitated the 
rise of the so­called Islamic State (IS), a terrorist group that has 
become known as much for its ruthless territorial expansion on 
the ground as it has for its savvy use of new digital technology 
for recruitment and violent propaganda. 
Indeed, following the Arab Spring, there appears to have been an 
analytical shift in focus to what some have called the “dark side” 
of internet freedoms – namely, to the many imagined dangers or 
risks now associated with new digital technologies (see Morozov 
2012; see also Mosco 2005). Where previously there was greater 
emphasis on the positive democratic potential of new media 
(see Castells 2012; Gerbaudo 2012; Bruns 2016), governments 
have turned their attention to a wide range of alarming online 
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has been imagined in the first place. Secondly, in order to distance 
ourselves from some of these impositions of political value 
onto digital technologies, we have instead chosen to look at 
it as symptomatic of a broader risk discourse around the war 
on terrorism. This allows us to move away, albeit temporarily, 
from the more theoretically difficult question of how digital 
technology contributes to violent political extremism and rather 
ask the more straightforward question of how and by whom these 
dangers have been imagined  as something in the first place.
Risk theory has been used to comprehend how uncertainties 
of modern societies have been approached in academic, policy 
and public debates (see Beck 1992; Giddens 1999). What is 
interesting about debates on risk is that the “dark” sides of 
digital technologies also seem to be increasingly understood in 
terms of the risks they pose: in the vulnerable youths who could 
potentially be recruited by terrorist propaganda; in finding new 
ways to prevent violent attacks that could be facilitated or inspired 
by online activity; and in the dangers of racist, xenophobic and 
misogynist hate speech. Amoore and de Goede (2008) further 
argue that the discourse around terrorism in the US and Europe 
has allowed new practices of governance to emerge through 
which these imagined risks are managed, including new methods 
of online surveillance and monitoring of online material that 
could be flagged as extremist or potentially violent. They write 
that “the proliferation of risk techniques in the war on terror, 
then, is essentially about a particular mode of governing – a 
means of making an uncertain and unknowable future amenable 
to intervention and management” (Amoore and de Goede 2008: 
9). Martin (2015) similarly argues that what matters in theories 
of radicalisation is not only gathering empirical evidence about 
a given situation, but it is also a way of using this research to 
prevent such dangers through policies linked to it. The majority 
of the academic literature on the topic has, as a consequence, 
tried to “model this process towards violence, such that it can 
be understood, predicted and acted upon” (Martin 2015: 63). 
3. The many metaphors of digital technology 
and conflict
This shift in focus (between what this relationship is versus 
how it has been articulated) thus allows us to explore how 
these imagined dangers of digital technologies have been 
foregrounded in political debates. The analytical framework 
developed in this article reflects this shift of focus. In particular, 
in order to distance ourselves from what we consider to be 
a set of overdetermined debates about digital technology’s 
many dangers, we draw instead on a “paradigmatic research 
framework” developed in conflict studies to explore different 
ways this relevance has been articulated as a part of political 
discourse. Coleman (2003, 2004, 2006) has argued that, in order 
to understand how any given conflict situation is understood by 
its participants, we need to first ascertain how its basic premises 
have been framed by the different theories and methods used 
to understand it. Coleman (2004: 197) writes that “these frames 
help to organise our thinking about our work, but also constrain 
our understanding of the full complexity of the situations that 
we engage”. 
activities: sophisticated social media recruitment strategies 
by IS and their supporters; “home­grown” terrorists finding 
inspiration for attacks; individuals learning to build bombs 
from YouTube videos or online manuals; the coordination 
of terrorist networks in the murky underworld of encrypted 
communication and the dark web; and the spread of hate 
speech online around the so­called “migrant crisis” (see Carter 
et al. 2014, Edwards and Gribbon 2013; Briggs, 2011, Neumann 
2012, von Behr et al. 2013, Wojcieszak 2010). 
Nowhere has this shift been more evident as in the emerging field 
of research on violent online political extremism. Yet, despite such 
growing fears of online radicalisation – and the increased pressures 
governments face to act – there still seems to be insufficient 
empirical research that has systematically examined this assumed 
causal or quasi­causal relationship between online and offline 
activity. In their overview of existing literature, for instance, Gill 
et al. (2015) argue that the existing research suffers from lack of 
conceptual clarity about how this relationship between online 
activity and offline behaviour (such as radicalisation) should be 
assessed. On the one hand, theories in circulation subsume a 
wide range of online behaviour such as “accessing information 
on overseas events via the Internet, to accessing extremist content 
and propaganda, to detailing attack plans in a blog post” (ibid: 
5) into this general category.  On the other hand, there is an 
absence of empirical research that would substantiate this link 
in a wide variety of different settings and contexts (ibid):
 Even for a field as bereft of empiricism as terrorism studies, 
the striking lack of data is surprising. Of the 200 abstracts 
analysed, only 6.5% utilised any form of data. Primary 
data was utilised in just 2% of the studies, but this mostly 
focused on extremist forums and social media and, therefore, 
largely captured radicalised individuals (and not necessarily 
individuals prepared to conduct terrorism) … Instead, the 
literature assumes virtual space is a good substitute for 
physical interactions, but fails to tell us why and in what 
contexts in particular (ibid: 6).
Along the same lines, Conway (2016: 5) argues that “basic 
descriptive research is largely missing from this field, along 
with more complex theory­informed approaches seeking to 
show causal connections”. The literature on violent online 
extremism thus seems to suggest that online activity can, 
indeed, be a facilitator of radicalisation but it remains unclear 
what the differentiated role of “online” activity is and how its 
causal relationship to offline activity can be theorised (see Grey 
and Head, 2009; Archetti 2013; von Behr et al. 2013; Benson 
2014; Pauwels and Schils 2016). 
Given these epistemic uncertainties, we propose to adopt a 
different approach in this article. Firstly, instead of questioning 
how digital technology contributes to political expression – 
whether positively or negatively – we have chosen to approach 
this relationship as “overdetermined” (Laclau and Mouffe 1984). 
By this we suggest that currently there are more theories in 
circulation than factual evidence would warrant. Therefore, we 
argue that it makes sense to temporarily recoil from trying to 
understand what this relationship is (by positing, for instance, 
some underlying causal relationship between online behaviour 
and extremism offline) and rather first ask how this relationship 
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Our argument builds on this framework to explore how the 
relationship between digital technology and violent extremism 
has been framed in European counter­terrorism policy, and, 
in particular, in the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 
(TE­SATS) and documents chronicling the creation of the EU 
Internet Referral Unit (IRU), which has been created to address 
growing concerns regarding online radicalisation. Two issues 
are assessed in these documents: (1) how digital technology 
has been linked to violent extremism, and (2) the nature of 
the specific counter­measures that have been suggested to 
mitigate the risks of online radicalisation. We will analyse, in 
particular,  some of the presuppositions, implicit and explicit, 
through which the relationship between digital technology 
and violent extremism in Europe is currently understood in 
these documents, what the stakes behind it might be, as well 
what potential alternative frameworks could be developed 
for understanding this relationship. While digital technology 
arguably poses a new dynamic in conflict, we argue in this 
paper that the way we comprehend it nonetheless still relies 
on pre­existing paradigms of understanding that need to be 
critically examined.
4. Analysis
4.1 The creation of the EU Internet Referral Unit
Over the past decade, the EU has increasingly asserted that 
the internet plays a significant role in the radicalisation of 
individuals towards acts of terrorism. This is evident in Europol’s 
annual TE­SAT reports, as well as the EU’s broader Counter­
Terrorism Strategy. The 2014 TE­SAT report, for instance, states 
clearly that: 
 Terrorists and violent extremists of all affiliations make adamant 
use of the Internet, in particular social media, as pivotal 
tools for planning, targeting, recruitment, communication, 
bonding, instruction, training and propaganda. Social media 
are believed to have contributed to the acceleration of (self­) 
radicalisation among EU nationals (Europol 2014: 9).
The 2015 TE­SAT report similarly states that: “The nature 
of terrorist communication on the Internet is constantly 
changing as a result of new technologies that become available. 
Terrorist groups have continued to adapt their approaches 
to communication, exploiting new methods for interaction 
and networking on the Internet” (Europol 2015:12). Both 
these documents explicitly suggest that the internet and social 
media have become “pivotal” for groups planning to carry out 
politically violent acts and that the internet provides “new 
opportunities” for terrorists to target audiences with their 
messages, accelerating the process of radicalisation as a result. 
Furthermore, within the EU Counter­Terrorism Strategy, which 
was revised in June 2014 in light of “evolving trends” such 
as the growing number of foreign fighters and the increasing 
potential of the internet for the recruitment of terrorists,1 
one of the key priorities for the prevention of terrorism is to 
tackle the misuse of the internet by terrorist groups (Council 
1 For further information on this revision see: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/policies/fight­against­terrorism/
Moreover, Coleman proposes that we should look both at what 
has been both implicitly presupposed by these approaches as well 
as what has been explicitly presupposed. By implicit frames he 
refers to those types of often unconscious structures that shape 
our understanding of the world. He writes that: “Our metaphors 
of conflict are packed with a set of basic, often unexamined, 
assumptions that further guide our perception and information 
processing... These images and assumptions provide the backdrop 
for our implicit framing of intractable conflicts, which helps to 
determine our sense of our own role in the conflict” (Coleman 
2004: 197). These implicit frames consist of the kinds of basic 
assumptions regarding how we organise our understanding of 
what reality is, ideas of human nature, what power is, what the 
nature of conflict is, and who the stakeholders are. Besides these 
implicit frames, Coleman argues that we need to additionally 
look at how the theories and methods we use have been explicitly 
framed in our research. These explicit frames consist of theories 
and methods that researchers consciously adopt to make sense 
of conflict situations, such as key causal variables and levels of 
analysis (ibid: 200). 
Furthermore, Coleman (2004) points to five different paradigms 
through which conflicts have been historically understood. 
These are: (1) the realist paradigm, which relies on a political 
metaphor that sees “conflicts as dangerous, high­stakes 
games won through strategies of domination, control, and 
countercontrol” (ibid: 203); (2) the human relations paradigm, 
which is based on a social metaphor “of destructive relationships 
where parties are locked in an increasingly hostile and vicious 
escalatory spiral from which there appears to be no escape” 
(ibid: 207); (3) the medical paradigm, which views humans 
and social systems as basically health­oriented entities where 
pathological illnesses or destructive tendencies can nonetheless 
develop (ibid: 212); (4) the postmodern paradigm, which sees 
conflict as consisting of the different way parties “interact with 
one another to construct a sense of meaning, responsibility, and 
value in that setting” (ibid: 217); and, finally, (5) the systems 
theory paradigm, which sees conflicts as “entities made up of 
a variety of interdependent and interactive elements nested 
within other, increasingly complex environments” (ibid: 222). 
Each of these paradigms, Coleman continues, also creates a 
set of possible solutions to how the conflict could be resolved 
based on how its basic premises are implicitly and explicitly 
understood. The realist paradigm thus prefers deterrence, force 
and legal frameworks to mitigate the problems of conflict 
(Coleman 2004: 203). The human relations paradigm, on the 
contrary, leans towards softer methods such as increasing 
social interdependence and cooperation, as well as fostering 
reconciliation (ibid: 207). The medical paradigm sees conflicts 
as anomalies in a healthy system and thus, as a result, proposes 
to target them by identifying malignant social processes and 
cultural patterns that maintain these negative patterns (ibid: 
212). The postmodern paradigm, in turn, looks towards finding 
ways to transform the collective identities and narratives behind 
conflicts more egalitarian and sustainable (ibid: 217). Finally, 
the systems theory paradigm employs a multi­layered analysis 
whereby the solution is found in a heuristic understanding of 
the complex interactions that cause destructive patterns in 
society (ibid: 222­223).
S+F (34 Jg)  4/2016 | 239
Pohjonen/Ahmed, Narratives of Risk | T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T
the 2015 TE­SAT report outlines, propaganda material espoused 
by IS is targeted specifically at Muslims in Europe with the 
aim to construct an ...in­group/ out­group dichotomy, [where 
there is] “a strong emphasis on group solidarity and emotional 
bonds among Muslims” (Europol 2015: 21) as opposed to 
broader European values. Thus, within this context, the Muslim 
community are viewed as the most vulnerable to jihadi content 
online by groups that threaten Europe with violence. This 
further exemplifies how this initiative was triggered by events 
in Paris in January 20153 and the need to show EU citizens 
that something was being done about the perceived increasing 
threat of jihadi terrorism in Europe.
4.2 Discussion: implicit and explicit frames in the 
EU counter-terrorism policy?
While this only scratches the surface of the abundant discourse, 
we can nonetheless extrapolate from these documents some 
of the ways that the debates on digital technology have been 
framed. For instance, if we look closely at current EU counter­
terrorism policy from the perspective of Coleman’s (2004) 
model, it is clear that the dominant paradigm through which 
the imagined dangers of digital technology are framed is the 
realist one. This is reflected both in how digital technologies are 
imagined (through their propensity to be used for propaganda 
and for the planning of violent attacks by terrorist groups) and 
through the measures that need to be taken to prevent these 
imminent attacks (prioritising measures such as legislation 
and the policing of online behaviour). Concurrent with 
Coleman’s realist paradigm, the EU is asserting its strength 
in the form of Europol and bestowing the illusion of control 
over a situation that is, in reality, unpredictable and ultimately 
complex. Ultimately then, the backdrop of the EU’s narrative is 
to defend core European norms and values from being attacked 
and abused by terrorist groups who use, among other things, 
the internet and social media to do so. Such strong and emotive 
discourse effectively frames the conflict into two parties – 
those who respect these values and those who do not – thus 
establishing a strict division between those who belong to this 
European in­group and those who are outside it. As suggested 
in the concept note, “tackling this phenomenon efficiently 
requires the EU Member States to … ensure that [the] Internet 
remains a public good, free of terrorist and violent extremist 
propaganda while respecting fundamental principles such 
as the freedom of speech” (Council of the European Union 
2015a: 3). This line is particularly significant as the EU is 
demonstrating a strong will to defend these freedoms, even 
if, as critics have suggested, many of the practical measures 
proposed to counter online violent political extremism can 
have questionable ramifications on the same principles of 
freedom of speech that EU seeks to protect, such as through 
advocating measures of online surveillance and censorship to 
contain these imagined threats.
3 From 7­9 January 2015, 17 people were killed in attacks on the Charlie 
Hebdo headquarters, a kosher supermarket, and in a Paris suburb. Al­
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed the attacks.
of the European Union 2005: Article 13). This is most visibly 
reflected in the creation of the EU IRU, which was launched 
on 1 July 2015. This initiative aims to pool together resources 
and best practices to monitor violent extremist content online, 
as well as to work together with the internet industry and 
relevant competent authorities to remove content where 
necessary (Council of the European Union 2015a: 3).2 Whilst 
the creation of the EU IRU was formally announced in March 
2015, the founding rationale for the unit is explained by the 
EU Counter­Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, in a 
document dated 17 January 2015:
 Europe is facing an unprecedented, diverse and serious 
terrorist threat. The horrific attacks that took place in 
Paris between 7 and 9 January 2015 were followed by an 
unprecedented show of unity by millions of citizens in France 
and across Europe as well as a show of solidarity and political 
will by many EU and world leaders. In addition to action 
from the national governments, citizens are looking to the 
European Union to provide an ambitious response. Core 
European values have been attacked, in particular freedom 
of speech. The EU has to respond with meaningful action. 
Failure to do so could result in disillusionment of citizens 
with the EU (Council of the European Union 2015b: 1).
The Coordinator goes on to outline four areas in which 
to “amplify and accelerate” existing policy to prevent 
radicalisation – one of which is the internet (ibid: 2). 
What is evident in the documents is a sense of urgency in 
adopting these proposed measures for monitoring and removing 
extremist content in order to prevent potential future terrorist 
attacks. The EU IRU concept note states that terrorist use of 
the internet has “increased dramatically over recent years. 
Jihadist groups have shown a sophisticated understanding of how 
social networks operate and have launched well organised social 
media campaigns to recruit followers, promote or glorify acts 
of terrorism and violent extremism” (Council of the European 
Union 2015a: 1, emphasis added). Thus, the EU recognises that 
terrorist groups could conceivably (mis­)use the internet with a 
high degree of competence and such exploitation is potentially 
dangerous. Faced with this construction of digital technology 
and its associated risks, the EU thus needs a strong multi­national 
police force – Europol – to control and manage these “dark” 
sides of internet freedom. Furthermore, the measures infer a 
form of continued governance over “vulnerable audiences” who 
are more likely to be susceptible to such material. Even though 
recent TE­SAT reports have acknowledged that the internet is 
abused by all kinds of extremist groups (see for example Europol 
2013, 2014, 2015), and Europol refers to addressing the use of 
social media by terrorist organisations and violent extremists in 
general, the EU IRU appears to be primarily targeted at jihadi 
material as the concept note specifically cites internet usage 
by jihadi groups and the rising numbers of claimed supporters 
of IS on Twitter (Council of the European Union 2015a: 1). As 
2 The EU IRU builds on the earlier capabilities of the “Check the Web” 
project, a project where the “monitoring and evaluating terrorist 
websites” for intelligence purposes was seen as paramount to prevent 
new kinds of terrorist attacks from taking place (Council of the European 
Union 2007: 2). Thus, the EU IRU is an extension of this as it aims to 
respond more pro­actively by taking down terrorist content.
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perhaps be seen as reflective of the growing concerns regarding 
online radicalisation that the political establishment and public 
share, and the increasing urgency to do something about it, as 
it is about some ontological “object” out there. This does not 
mean that the internet does not play a significant role in violent 
radicalisation, but the way in which this (assumed) causal 
relationship has been constructed is potentially problematic. 
Whilst the EU certainly does not view the internet in isolation 
when dealing with the issue of violent extremism, there is 
an implication within the documents studied that there has 
been a radical shift in the way that the internet presents new 
challenges to security. However, terrorist groups have existed 
long before the internet, and although the internet is a new 
medium through which terrorists communicate, the internet 
has not necessarily altered the reasons why individuals choose 
to engage in terrorism.  Looking critically at the metaphors 
through which this relationship between digital technology 
and conflict has been imagined, rather than accepting it at face 
value, can thus help us gain distance from both the utopian 
and, increasingly, dystopian impositions of political value on 
technologies that themselves are neutral.  
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It is also important to consider that the realist paradigm is 
not the only way the relationship between digital technology 
and conflict could be understood. As Coleman has suggested, 
depending on the framework we find most useful for 
understanding conflict, we could as well view violent extremism 
as the outcome of destructive social relationships between 
different groups in society, in which case more interdependence 
and reconciliation would be a more suitable remedy to counter 
it. Or, we could approach radicalisation as a phenomenon rooted 
in questions of social identity, which, in turn, would require us 
to diagnose the reasons for this (such as social alienation and 
disenfranchisement) and take measures to treat the root causes 
of the problem.  In other words, this shift of focus would place 
emphasis on addressing the reasons why individuals choose to 
seek out extremist material on the internet in the first place, 
rather than approaching the problem through realist metaphors 
of propaganda and war and as a result through methods of 
control and counter­control. 
We could equally argue that there is an urgent need to create 
new narratives in Europe that are not exclusionary, but 
rather consist of ways of renegotiating what it means to be 
European in a multicultural society and thus prevent some of 
the polarised identities resulting from the profiling of Muslims 
as a group especially vulnerable to online radicalisation. New 
research has begun to examine possible ways of fostering 
online spaces of engagement and counter­speech as conflict 
mediation mechanisms; however, more needs to be done to 
make such approaches inclusive and not just another form of 
counter­propaganda (see Bartlett and Krasodomski­Jones 2015; 
Ferguson 2016). These new ways of understanding online 
extremism as a symptom of an underlying conflict, and partially 
also the metaphors we use to frame this conflict, could thus 
potentially help us move beyond the realist paradigm and 
instead engender new innovative solutions to address the issue 
of online radicalisation. Indeed, if new digital technologies are 
increasingly framed as dangerous, and as a result governments 
resort to using strategies of propaganda and control to prevent 
these dangers from manifesting, perhaps the policies we adopt 
also contribute to the problems that we are trying to prevent by, 
for instance, alienating “vulnerable audiences” through their 
stigmatisation as potential enemies or as risks to be managed 
(see Ericson 2008).
5. Conclusion
This article has looked critically at how we frame the relationship 
between digital technology and violent extremism, focusing 
especially on the contemporary debates on violent online 
political extremism and European counter­terrorism strategy. 
Given the current lack of conceptual clarity and empirical 
evidence, we argued that it makes sense to temporarily step back 
from the existing debates and look instead at what has been 
presupposed by these debates and how they have been framed. 
Ericson writes that “terrorism is the politics of uncertainty 
… terrorists are in the business of uncertainty, playing on 
randomness to keep whole populations in fear, anticipation and 
disestablishment” (Ericson 2008: 58). This way, the debates could 
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